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ON MATHIAS GENERIC SETS
PETER A. CHOLAK, DAMIR D. DZHAFAROV, AND JEFFRY L. HIRST
Abstract. We present some results about generics for computable Mathias
forcing. The n-generics and weak n-generics in this setting form a strict hi-
erarchy as in the case of Cohen forcing. We analyze the complexity of the
Mathias forcing relation, and show that if G is any n-generic with n ≥ 3 then
it satisfies the jump property G(n−1) = G′ ⊕ ∅(n). We prove that every such
G has generalized high degree, and so cannot have even Cohen 1-generic de-
gree. On the other hand, we show that G, together with any bi-immune set
A ≤T ∅
(n−1), computes a Cohen n-generic set.
1. Introduction
Forcing has been a central technique in computability theory since it was intro-
duced (in the form we now call Cohen forcing) by Kleene and Post to exhibit a
degree strictly between 0 and 0′. The study of the algorithmic properties of Co-
hen generic sets, and of the structure of their degrees, has long been a rich source
of problems and results. In the present paper, we propose to undertake a similar
investigation of generic sets for (computable) Mathias forcing, and present some of
our initial results in this direction.
Mathias forcing was perhaps first used in computability theory by Soare in [10]
to build a set with no subset of strictly higher degree. Subsequently, it became a
prominent tool for constructing infinite homogeneous sets for computable colorings
of pairs of integers, as in Seetapun and Slaman [8], Cholak, Jockusch, and Slaman
[2], and Dzhafarov and Jockusch [4]. It has also found applications in algorithmic
randomness, in Binns, Kjos-Hanssen, Lerman, and Solomon [1].
We show below that a number of results for Cohen generics hold also for Mathias
generics, and that a number of others do not. The main point of distinction is that
neither the set of conditions, nor the forcing relation is computable, so many usual
techniques do not carry over. We begin with background in Section 2, and present
some preliminary results in Section 3. In Section 4 we characterize the complexity of
the forcing relation, and in Section 5 we prove a number of results about the degrees
of Mathias generic sets, and about their relationship to Cohen generic degrees. We
indicate questions along the way we hope will be addressed in future work.
2. Definitions
We assume familiarity with the terminology particular to Cohen forcing. (For
background on computability theory, see [9]. For background on Cohen generic
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sets, see Section 1.24 of [3].) The purpose of this section is to set down the precise
analogues for Mathias forcing. These are standard, but their formalizations in the
setting of computability theory require some care. A slightly different presentation
is given in [1, Section 6], over which ours has the benefit of reducing the complexity
of the set of conditions from Σ03 to Π
0
2.
Definition 2.1.
(1) A (computable Mathias) pre-condition is a pair (D,E) where D is a finite
set, E is a computable set, and maxD < minE.
(2) A (computable Mathias) condition is a pre-condition (D,E), such that E
is infinite.
(3) A pre-condition (D′, E′) extends a pre-condition (D,E), written (D′, E′) ≤
(D,E), if D ⊆ D′ ⊆ D ∪ E and E′ ⊆ E.
(4) A set A satisfies a pre-condition (D,E) if D ⊆ A ⊆ D ∪ E.
By an index for a pre-condition (D,E) we shall mean a pair (d, e) such that d
is the canonical index of D and E = {x : Φe(x) ↓= 1}. In particular, if E is finite,
Φe need not be total. This definition makes the set of all indices Π
0
1, but we can
pass to a computable subset containing an index for every pre-condition. Namely,
define a strictly increasing computable function g by
Φg(d,e)(x) =
{
0 if x ≤ maxDd,
Φe(x) otherwise.
Then the set of pairs of the form (d, g(d, e)) is computable, and each is an index for
a pre-condition. Moreover, if (d, e) is an index as well, then it and (d, g(d, e)) index
the same pre-condition. Formally, all references to pre-conditions in the sequel will
be to indices from this set, and we shall treatD and E as numbers when convenient.
Note that whether one pre-condition extends another is a Π02 question. By
adopting the convention that for all e and x, if Φe(x) ↓ then Φe(y) ↓∈ {0, 1} for all
y ≤ x, the same question for conditions becomes Π01.
In what follows, a Σ0n set of conditions refers to a Σ
0
n-definable set of pre-
conditions, each of which is a condition. (Note that this is not the same as the
set of all conditions satisfying a given Σ0n definition, as discussed further in the
next section.) As usual, we call such a set dense if it contains an extension of every
condition.
Definition 2.2. Fix n ∈ ω.
(1) A set A meets a set C of conditions if it satisfies some member of C.
(2) A set A avoids a set C of conditions if it meets the set of conditions having
no extension in C.
(3) A set G isMathias n-generic if it meets or avoids every Σ0n set of conditions.
(4) A set G is weakly Mathias n-generic if it meets every dense Σ0n set of
conditions.
We call a degree generic if it contains a set that is n-generic for all n.
It is easy to see that for every n ≥ 2, there exists a Mathias n-generic G ≤T ∅(n)
(indeed, even G′ ≤T ∅(n)). This is done just as in Cohen forcing, but as there is
no computable listing of Σ0n sets of conditions, one goes through the Σ
0
n sets of
pre-conditions and checks which of these consist of conditions alone. We pass to
some other basic properties of generics. We shall refer to Mathias n-generics below
simply as n-generics when no confusion is possible.
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3. Basic results
Note that the set of all conditions is Π02. Thus, the set of conditions satisfying a
given Σ0n definition is Σ
0
n if n ≥ 3, and Σ
0
3 otherwise. For n < 3, we may thus wish
to consider the following stronger form of genericity, which has no analogue in the
case of Cohen forcing.
Definition 3.1. A set G is strongly n-generic if, for every Σ0n-definable set of pre-
conditions C, either G meets some condition in C or G meets the set of conditions
not extended by any condition in C.
Proposition 3.2. For n ≥ 3, a set is strongly n-generic if and only if it is n-
generic. For n ≤ 2, a set is strongly n-generic if and only if it is 3-generic.
Proof. Evidently, every strongly n-generic set is n-generic. Now suppose C is a Σ0n
set of pre-conditions, and let C′ consist of all the conditions in C. An infinite set
meets or avoids C if and only if it meets or avoids C′, so every max{n, 3}-generic
set meets or avoids C. For n ≥ 3, this means that every n-generic set is strongly
n-generic, and for n ≤ 2 that every 3-generic set is strongly n-generic.
It remains to show that every strongly 0-generic set is 3-generic. Let C be a
given Σ03 set of conditions, and let R be a computable relation such that (D,E)
belongs to C if and only if (∃a)(∀x)(∃y)R(D,E, a, x, y). Define a strictly increasing
computable function g by
Φg(D,E,a)(x) =
{
Φe(x) if (∃y)R(D,E, a, x, y) and ΦE(x) ↓,
↑ otherwise,
and let C′ be the computable set of all pre-conditions of the form (D, g(D,E, a)).
If (D,E) ∈ C then ΦE is total and so there is an a such that Φg(D,E,a) = ΦE . If,
on the other hand, (D,E) is a pre-condition not in C then for each a there is an x
such that Φg(D,E,a)(x) ↑. Thus, the members of C are precisely the conditions in
C′, so an infinite set meets or avoids one if and only if it meets or avoids the other.
In particular, every strongly 0-generic set meets or avoids C. 
As a consequence, we shall restrict ourselves to 3-genericity or higher from now
on. Without further qualification, n below will always be a number ≥ 3.
Proposition 3.3. Every n-generic set is weakly n-generic, and every weakly n-
generic set is (n− 1)-generic.
Proof. The first implication is clear. For the second, let a Σ0n−1 set C of conditions
be given. Let D be the class of all conditions that are either in C or else have no
extension in C, which is clearly dense. If n ≥ 4, then D is easily seen to be Σ0n
(actually Π0n−1) since saying a condition (D,E) has no extension in C is expressed
as
∀(D′, E′)[[(D′, E′) is a condition ∧ (D′, E′) ≤ (D,E)] =⇒ (D′, E′) /∈ C].
If n = 3, this makes D appear to be Σ04 but since C is a set of conditions only, we
can re-write the above line as
∀(D′, E′)[(∀x)[ΦE′ (x) ↓= 1 ∧ ΦE(x) ↓ =⇒ ΦE(x) = 1] =⇒ (D
′, E′) /∈ C],
which gives a Σ03 definition. In either case, then, a weakly n-generic set must meet
D, and hence must either meet or avoid C. 
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The proof of the following proposition is straightforward.
Proposition 3.4. Every weakly n-generic set G is hyperimmune relative to ∅(n−1).
If G is n-generic, then its degree forms a minimal pair with 0(n−1).
Corollary 3.5. Not every n-generic set is weakly (n+ 1)-generic.
Proof. Take any n-generic G ≤T ∅(n). Then G is not hyperimmune relative to
∅(n+1), and so cannot be weakly (n+ 1)-generic. 
We shall separate weakly n-generic sets from n-generic sets in Section 5, thereby
obtaining a strictly increasing sequence of genericity notions
weakly 3-generic ⇐= 3-generic ⇐= weakly 4-generic ⇐= · · ·
as in the case of Cohen forcing. In many other respects, however, the two types of
genericity are very different. For instance, as noted in [2, Section 4.1], every Mathias
generic G is cohesive, i.e., satisfies G ⊆∗ W or G ⊆∗ W for every computably
enumerable set W . In particular, if we write G = G0 ⊕G1 then one of G0 or G1 is
finite. This is be false for Cohen generics, which, by an analogue of van Lambalgen’s
theorem due to Yu [11, Proposition 2.2], have relatively n-generic halves. Thus, no
Mathias generic can be even Cohen 1-generic.
Question 3.6. What form of van Lambalgen’s theorem holds for Mathias forcing?
Another basic fact is that every Mathias n-generic G is high, i.e., satisfies G′ ≥T
∅′′. (See [1], Corollary 6.7, or [2], Section 5.1 for a proof.) By contrast, it is a well-
known result of Jockusch [5, Lemma 2.6] that every Cohen n-generic set G satisfies
G(n) ≡T G ⊕ ∅
(n). As no high G can satisfy G′′ ≤T G ⊕ ∅
′′, it follows that no
Mathias generic can have even Cohen 2-generic degree. The same argument does
not prevent a Mathias n-generic from having Cohen 1-generic degree, as there are
high 1-generic sets, but we prove in Corollary 5.6 that this does not happen either.
4. The forcing relation
Much of the discrepancy between Mathias and Cohen genericity stems from the
fact that the complexity of forcing a formula, defined below, does not agree with
the complexity of the formula.
We regard every Σ00 formula ϕ as being written in disjunctive normal form ac-
cording to some fixed effective procedure for doing so. Let nϕ denote the number of
disjuncts. For each i < nϕ, let Pϕ,i be the set of all n such that n ∈ X is a conjunct
of the ith disjunct, and let Nϕ,i be the set of all n such that n /∈ X is a conjunct of
the ith disjunct. Canonical indices for these sets can be found uniformly effectively
from an index for ϕ.
Definition 4.1. Let (D,E) be a condition and let ϕ(X) be a formula in exactly
one free set variable. If ϕ is Σ00, say (D,E) forces ϕ(G), written (D,E)  ϕ(G),
if for some i < nϕ, Pϕ,i ⊆ D and Nϕ,i ⊆ D ∪ E. From here, extend the definition
of (D,E)  ϕ(G) to arbitrary ϕ inductively according to the standard definition of
strong forcing.
Remark 4.2. Note that if ϕ is Σ00 and A is any set then ϕ(A) holds if and only if
there is an i < nϕ such that Pϕ,i ⊆ A and Nϕ,i ⊆ A. Hence, (D,E)  ϕ(G) if and
only if ϕ(D ∪ F ) holds for all finite F ⊂ E.
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Lemma 4.3. Let (D,E) be a condition and let ϕ(X) be a formula in exactly one
free set variable.
(1) If ϕ is Σ00 then the relation (D,E)  ϕ(G) is computable.
(2) If ϕ is Π01, Σ
0
1, or Σ
0
2, then so is the relation (D,E)  ϕ(G).
(3) For n ≥ 2, if ϕ is Π0n then the relation of (D,E)  ϕ(G) is Π
0
n+1.
(4) For n ≥ 3, if ϕ is Σ0n then the relation (D,E)  ϕ(G) is Σ
0
n+1.
Proof. We first prove 1. If ϕ is Σ00 and ϕ(D ∪ F ) does not hold for some finite
F ⊂ E, then neither does
ϕ(D ∪ (F ∩ (
⋃
i<nϕ
Pϕ,i ∪Nϕ,i))).
So by Remark 4.2, we have that (D,E)  ϕ(G) if and only if ϕ(D ∪ F ) holds for
all finite F ⊂ E ∩ (
⋃
i<nϕ
Pϕ,i ∪Nϕ,i), which can be checked computably.
For 2, suppose that ϕ(X) ≡ (∀x)θ(x,X), where θ is Σ00. We claim that (D,E)
forces ϕ(G) if and only if θ(a,D ∪ F ) holds for all a and all finite F ⊂ E, which
makes the forcing relation Π01. The right to left implication is clear. For the other,
suppose there is an a and a finite F ⊂ E such that θ(a,D ∪ F ) does not hold.
Writing θa(X) for the formula θ(a,X), let D
′ = D ∪ F and
E′ = {x ∈ E : x > maxD ∪ F ∪
⋃
i<nθa
Pθa,i ∪Nθa,i},
so that (D′, E′) is a condition extending (D,E). Then if (D′′, E′′) is any extension
of (D′, E′), we have that
D′′ ∩ (
⋃
i<nθa
Pθa,i ∪Nθa,i)) = (D ∪ F ) ∩ (
⋃
i<nθa
Pθa,i ∪Nθa,i)),
and so θ(a,D′′) cannot force θ(a,G). Thus (D,E) does not force ϕ(G). The rest
of 2 follows immediately, since forcing a formula that is Σ01 over another formula is
Σ01 over the complexity of forcing that formula.
We next prove 3 for n = 2. Suppose that ϕ(G) ≡ (∀x)(∃y)θ(x, y,X) where θ is
Σ00. Our claim is that (D,E)  ϕ(G) if and only if, for every a and every condition
(D′, E′) extending (D,E), there is a finite F ⊂ E′ and a number k > maxF such
that
(1) (D′ ∪ F, {x ∈ E′ : x > k})  (∃y)θ(a, y,G),
which is a Π03 definition. Since the condition on the left side of (1) extends (D
′, E′),
this definition clearly implies forcing. For the opposite direction, suppose (D,E) 
ϕ(G) and fix any a and (D′, E′) ≤ (D,E). Then by definition, there is a b and
a condition (D′′, E′′) extending (D′, E′) that forces θ(a, b,G). Write θa,b(X) =
θ(a, b,X), and let F ⊂ E′ be such that D′′ = D′ ∪ F . Since θa,b(D′ ∪ F ) holds, we
must have Pθa,b,i ⊆ D
′ ∪ F and Nθa,b,i ∩ (D
′ ∪ F ) = ∅ for some i < nθa,b . Thus, if
we let k = maxNθa,b,i, we obtain (1).
To complete the proof, we prove 3 and 4 for n ≥ 3 by simultaneous induction on
n. Clearly, 3 for n− 1 implies 4 for n, so we already have 4 for n = 3. Now assume
4 for some n ≥ 3. The definition of forcing a Π0n+1 statement is easily seen to be Π
0
2
over the relation of forcing a Σ0n statement, and hence Π
0
n+2 by hypothesis. Thus,
3 holds for n+ 1. 
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We shall see in Corollary 5.2 that the complexity bounds in parts 3 and 4 of the
lemma cannot be lowered even to ∆0n+1. One consequence is that an n-generic set
only decides every Σ0n−1 formula, not necessarily every Σ
0
n formula.
Proposition 4.4. Let G be n-generic, and for m ≤ n let ϕ(X) be a Σ0m or Π
0
m
formula in exactly one free set variable. If (D,E) is any condition satisfied by G
that forces ϕ(G), then ϕ(G) holds.
Proof. If m = 0, then ϕ holds of any set satisfying (D,E), whether it is generic
or not. If m > 0 and the result holds for Π0m−1 formulas, it also clearly holds for
Σ0m formulas. Thus, we only need to show that if m > 0 and the result holds for
Σ0m−1 formulas then it also holds for Π
0
m formulas. To this end, suppose ϕ(X) ≡
(∀x)θ(x,X), where θ is Σ0m−1. For each a, let Ca be the set of all conditions forcing
θ(a,X), which has complexity at most Σ0n by Lemma 4.3. Hence, G meets or avoids
each Ca. But if G were to avoid some Ca, say via a condition (D
′, E′), then (D′, E′)
would force ¬θ(a,G), and then (D,E) and (D′, E′) would have a common extension
forcing θ(a,G) and ¬θ(a,G). Thus, G meets every Ca, so θ(a,G) holds for all a by
hypothesis, meaning ϕ(G) holds. 
Remark 4.5. It is not difficult to see that if ϕ(G) is the negation of a Σ0m formula
then any condition (D,E) forcing ϕ(G) forces an equivalent Π0m formula. Thus, if
G is n-generic and satisfies such a condition, then ϕ(G) holds.
5. Degrees of Mathias generics
We begin here with a jump property for Mathias generics similar to that of
Jockusch for Cohen generics. It follows that the degrees d satisfying d(n−1) =
d′ ∪ 0(n−1) yield a strict hierarchy of subclasses of the high degrees.
Theorem 5.1. For all n ≥ 2, if G is n-generic then G(n−1) ≡T G′ ⊕ ∅(n).
Proof. That G(n−1) ≥T G′ ⊕ ∅(n) follows from the fact that G′ ≥T ∅′′. To show
G(n−1) ≤T G′ ⊕ ∅(n), we wish to decide every Σ
0,G
n−1 sentences using G
′ ⊕ ∅(n). Let
ϕ0(X), ϕ1(X), . . ., be a computable enumeration of all Σ
0
n−1 sentences in exactly
one free set variable, and for each i let Ci be the set of conditions forcing ϕi(G),
and Di the set of conditions forcing ¬ϕ(G). Then Di is the set of conditions with
no extension in Ci, so if G meets Ci it cannot also meet Di. On the other hand, if
G avoids Ci then it meets Di by definition. Now by Lemma 4.3, each Ci is Σ0n since
n ≥ 3, and so it is met or avoided by G. Thus, for each i, either G meets Ci, in
which case ϕ(G) holds by Proposition 4.4, or else G meets Di, in which case ¬ϕ(G)
holds by Remark 4.5. To conclude the proof, we observe that G′ ⊕∅(n) can decide,
uniformly in i, whether G meets Ci or Di. Indeed, from a given i, indices for Ci and
Di (as a Σ0n set and a Π
0
n set, respectively) can be found uniformly computably,
and then ∅(n) has only to produce these sets until a condition in one is found that
is satisfied by G, which can in turn be determined by G′. 
Corollary 5.2. For every n ≥ 2 there is a Π0n formula in exactly one free set
variable, the relation of forcing which is not ∆0n+1. For n ≥ 3, there is also a Σ
0
n
such formula.
Proof. By the proof of Lemma 4.3, the second part implies the first, so it suffices to
prove it. If forcing every Σ0n formula ϕ(X) were ∆
0
n+1, then the proof of Theorem
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5.1 could be carried out computably in G′⊕∅(n−1) instead of G′⊕∅(n). Hence, we
would have G(n−1) ≡T G′ ⊕ ∅(n−1). But as G is high, ∅(n−1) ≤T G(n−2), so this
would yield G(n−1) ≤T G(n−2), a contradiction. 
The following result is the analogue of Theorem 2.3 of Kurtz [7] that every
A >T ∅(n−1) hyperimmune relative to ∅(n−1) is Turing equivalent to the (n − 1)st
jump of a weakly Cohen n-generic set. The proof, although mostly similar, requires
a few important modifications. The main problem is in coding B into A(n−2),
which, in the case of Cohen forcing, is done by appending long blocks of 1s to the
strings under construction. As the infinite part of a Mathias condition can be made
very sparse, we cannot use the same idea here. We highlight the changes below,
and sketch the rest of the details.
Proposition 5.3. If A >T ∅(n−1) is hyperimmune relative to ∅(n−1), then A ≡T
G(n−2) for some weakly n-generic set G.
Proof. Computably in A, we build a sequence of conditions (D0, E0) ≥ (D1, E1) ≥
· · · beginning with (D0, E0) = (∅, ω). Let C0, C1, . . . be a listing of all Σ0n sets of pre-
conditions, and fixing a ∅(n−1)-computable enumeration of each Ci, let Ci,s be the
set of all pre-conditions enumerated into Ci by stage pA(s). We may assume that
〈D,E〉 ≤ s for all (D,E) ∈ Ci,s. Let B0, B1, . . . be a uniformly ∅(n−1)-computable
sequence of pairwise disjoint co-immune sets. Say Ci requires attention at stage
s if there exists b ≤ pA(s) in Bi ∩ Es and a condition (D,E) in Ci,s extending
(Ds ∪ {b}, {x ∈ Es : x > b}).
At stage s, assume (Ds, Es) is given. If there is no i ≤ s such that Ci requires
attention at stage s, set (Ds+1, Es+1) = (Ds, Es). Otherwise, fix the least such
i. Choose the least corresponding b and earliest enumerated extension (D,E) in
Ci,s, and let (D
′, E′) = (D,E). Then obtain (D′′, E′′) from (D′, E′) by forcing the
jump, in the usual manner. Finally, let k be the number of stages t < s such that
(Dt, Et) 6= (Dt+1, Et+1), and let (D′′′, E′′′) = (D′′ ∪ {b}, {x ∈ E′′ : x > b}), where
b is the least element of BA(k) ∩ E
′′. If 〈D′′′, E′′′〉 ≤ s + 1, set (Ds+1, Es+1) =
(D′′′, E′′′), and otherwise set (Ds+1, Es+1) = (Ds, Es).
By definition, the Bi must intersect every computable set infinitely often, and so
the entire construction is A-computable. That G =
⋃
sDs is weakly n-generic can
be verified much like in Kurtz’s proof, but using the ∅(n−1)-computable function h
where h(s) is the least t so that for each (D,E) with 〈D,E〉 ≤ s there exists b ≤ t in
Bi∩E and (D′, E′) ∈ Ci,t extending (D∪{b}, {x ∈ E : x > b}). That G(n−2) ≤T A
follows by Theorem 5.1 from G′ being forced during the construction and thus being
A-computable. Finally, to show A ≤T G
(n−2), let s0 < s1 < · · · be all the stages
s > 0 such that (Ds−1, Es−1) 6= (Ds, Es). The sequence (Ds0 , Es0) > (Ds1 , Es1) · · ·
can be computed by G(n−2) as follows. Given (Dsk , Esk), the least b ∈ G−Dsk must
belong to some Bi, and since G
(n−2) computes ∅(n−1) it can tell which Bi. Then
G(n−2) can produce Ci until the first (D′, E′) extending (Dsk ∪ {b}, {x ∈ Esk : x >
b}), and then obtain (D′′, E′′) from (D′, E′) by forcing the jump. By construction,
G satisfies (D′′, E′′) and (Dsk+1 , Esk+1) = (D
′′∪{b}, {x ∈ E′′ : x > b}) for the least
b ∈ G−Dsk+1 . And this b is in B1 or B0 depending as k is or is not in B. 
Corollary 5.4. Not every weakly n-generic set is (n+ 1)-generic.
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Proof. By the previous proposition, ∅(n) ≡T G(n−2) for some weakly n-generic set
G. By Theorem 5.1, if G were n-generic we would have ∅(n+1) ≡T G(n−1) ≡T
G′ ⊕ ∅(n) ≡T ∅(n), which cannot be. 
In spite of Theorem 5.1, we are still left with the possibility that some Mathias
n-generic set has Cohen 1-generic degree. We now show that this cannot happen.
Theorem 5.5. If G is n-generic then it has GH1 degree, i.e., G
′ ≡T (G⊕ ∅′)′.
Proof. A condition (D,E) forces i ∈ (G⊕ ∅′)′ if there is a σ ∈ 2<ω such that that
Φσi (i) ↓ and for all x < |σ|,
σ(x) = 1 =⇒ (D,E)  x ∈ G⊕ ∅′ and σ(x) = 0 =⇒ (D,E)  x /∈ G⊕ ∅′.
This is thus a Σ02 relation, as forcing x ∈ G ⊕ ∅
′ and x /∈ G ⊕ ∅′ are Σ01 and Π
0
1,
respectively. We claim that (D,E) forcing i /∈ (G ⊕ ∅′)′, i.e., ¬(i ∈ (G ⊕ ∅′)′),
is equivalent to (D,E) having no finite extension that forces i ∈ (G ⊕ ∅′)′, and
hence is Π02. That forcing implies this fact is clear. In the other direction, suppose
(D,E) does not force i /∈ (G ⊕ ∅′)′, and so has an extension (D′, E′) that forces
i /∈ (G ⊕ ∅′)′. Let σ witness this fact, as above. Then if P and N consist of
the x < |σ| such that σ(2x) = 1 and σ(2x) = 0, respectively, σ witnesses that
(D ∪ P, {x ∈ E : x > maxP ∪N}) also forces i ∈ (G⊕ ∅′)′.
We now show that G′ ≥T (G ⊕ ∅′)′. Let Ci be the set of conditions that force
i ∈ (G ⊕ ∅′)′, and Di the set of conditions that force i /∈ (G ⊕ ∅′)′. Then Ci is Σ03
and Di is Π02, and indices for them as such can be found uniformly from i. Each Ci
must be either met or avoided by G, and as in the proof of Theorem 5.1, G meets Ci
if and only if it does not meet Di. Which of the two is the case can be determined
by G′ since G′ ≥T ∅′′ and Ci and Di are both c.e. in ∅′′. By Proposition 4.4, G′ can
thus determine whether i ∈ (G⊕ ∅′)′, as desired. 
Recall that a degree d is GLn if d
(n) = d ∪ 0(n), and that no such degree can
be GH1. It was shown by Jockusch and Posner [6, Corollary 7] that every GL2
degree computes a Cohen 1-generic set. Hence, we obtain the following:
Corollary 5.6. Every Mathias n-generic set has GLm degree for all m ≥ 1. Hence,
it is not of Cohen 1-generic degree, but it does compute a Cohen 1-generic.
The corollary leaves open the following question, which we have so far been
unable to answer. The subsequent results give partial answers.
Question 5.7. Does every Mathias n-generic set compute a Cohen n-generic set?
Theorem 5.8. If G is Mathias n-generic, and A ≤T ∅
(n−1) is bi-immune, then
G⊕A computes a Cohen n-generic.
Proof. Let C0, C1, . . . be a listing of all Σ
0
n subsets of 2
<ω, together with fixed ∅(n−1)-
computable enumerations. For each i, let Di be the set of all conditions (D,E) such
that D ∩A, viewed as a binary string of length minE, belongs to Ci. Then Di is a
Σ0n set of conditions, and as such must be met or avoided by G. If G meets Di then
G ∩ A, viewed as an element of 2ω, meets Ci. If G avoids Di, we claim that G ∩ A
must avoid Ci. Indeed, suppose G avoids Di via (D,E). Since A and A are each
co-immune, they intersect E infinitely often, and so if D ∩ B had an extension τ
in Ci, we could make a finite extension (D′, E′) of (D,E) so that D′ ∩A = τ . This
extension would belong to Di, a contradiction. 
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It follows, for example, that the join of G with any non-computable S ≤T ∅′
computes a Cohen n-generic. Our last result shows that the kind of coding employed
in the above theorem cannot be used also for S = ∅.
Proposition 5.9. If G is Mathias n-generic and H is Cohen n-generic then H is
not many-one reducible to G.
Proof. Seeking a contradiction, suppose f is a computable function such that
f(H) ⊆ G and f(H) ⊆ G. Since G is cohesive and ran(f) is c.e., and since H
is non-computable, it follows that G ⊆∗ ran(f). Thus, for all sufficiently large a,
a ∈ G⇐⇒ (∀x)[f(x) = a =⇒ x ∈ H ]⇐⇒ (∃x)[f(x) = a ∧ x ∈ H ].
We conclude that G ≤T H , and hence that G ≡T H . But this contradicts our
observation at the end of Section 3 that no Mathias n-generic can have Cohen
n-generic degree. 
The following question is inspired by Proposition 2.8 of Jockusch [5].
Question 5.10. If a and b are two Mathias generic degrees, must D(≤ a) and
D(≤ b) be elementarily equivalent?
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